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Common Regulation: Legal Origins of
State Power in America
by
WILLIAM J. NOVAK*

Introduction
As the lone historian participating in this Symposium, I am
obliged to turn attention to historical antecedents and the broader
context of modem constitutional adjudication. At an earlier point in
our jurisprudential history, such a move would have been superfluous,
not anomalous. In the early twentieth century, American constitutional commentary was dominated by historically-minded social thinkers like James Bradley Thayer, Edward S. Corwin, and Thomas Reed
Powell. A thorough grounding in constitutional history was a prerequisite to almost all discussions of constitutional law and theory.
Since World War II, however, the role of historical knowledge
and method in constitutional thought has deteriorated, replaced by a
steady string of distinctly antihistorical perspectives: the legal process
of Henry Hart and Albert Sacks, the neutral principles of Herbert
Wechsler, the judicial craftsmanship of Alexander Bickel, the original
understanding of Robert Bork, the law and economics of Richard Posner, the neo-Kantian rights theories of John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin, and ultimately the "law of rules" of Antonin Scalia, which serves
as a backdrop to this Symposium.' Given some of the disturbing con* Assistant Professor of History, University of Chicago. Ph.D. 1991, Brandeis University. The author thanks Jay Blount, Stephen Gottlieb, Hendrik Hartog, Morton Keller,
James Kloppenberg, Margaret Novak, Richard Ross, Suzanna Sherry, David Tannenhaus,
Christopher Tomlins, and Michael Willrich for their suggestions, criticisms, and advice.
1. The principal texts in these traditions are HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M.
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF
LAW (1958); Herbert Wechsler, Toward NeutralPrinciplesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV.
L. Rnv. 1 (1959); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS: THE SUPREME COURT AT WORK (1957);
Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REv. 40 (1961); ROBERT
H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990);
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1973); JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF
[1061]
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clusions and policies generated by these "time-less" constitutionalisms
(from Bickel's defense of federalism and critique of Brown in an era
of civil rights crisis2 to Posner's similarly ill-timed attack on federal
AIDS spending 3), it is a propitious moment to reconsider the virtues
4
of a historical approach to American constitutional law.
(1971); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); Antonin Scalia,
The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175 (1989).
2. For the most judicious analysis of Bickel's positions on these matters, see Clyde
Spillenger, Reading the Judicial Canon: Alexander Bickel and the Book of Brandeis, 79 J.

JUSTICE

AM. HIST. 125 (1992).

3. TOMAS J. PHILIPSON & RICHARD A. POSNER, PRIVATE CHOICES AND PUBLIC
HEALTH: THE AIDS EPIDEMIC IN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1993).
4.

The much-debated "republican revival" and the recent treatises of Cass Sunstein

and Bruce Ackerman seem to signal a pending historical turn in constitutional jurisprudence. But both literatures remain problematic from a historian's perspective. As Terry
Fisher and Linda Kerber have argued, the "neo-republican" effort to reach back across two
hundred years of American history and extract from the Founding a single, coherent ideological template to guide contemporary decision making is reductionist, "anachronistic,"
and doomed to failure. See William W. Fisher III, Making Sense of Madison: Nedelsky on
PrivateProperty, 18 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 547 (1993); Linda K. Kerber, Making Republicanism Useful, 97 YALE L.J. 1663 (1988); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J.
1493 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988).
The best historical overviews and assessments of the republicanism literature can be found
in James T. Kloppenberg, The Virtues of Liberalism: Christianity,Republicanism, and Ethics in Early American Political Discourse, 74 J. AM. HIsT. 9 (1987); Isaac Kramnick, The
"Great National Discussion": The Discourse of Politics in 1787, 45 WM. & MARY Q. 3
(1988); Daniel T. Rodgers, Republicanism: The Careerof a Concept, 79 J. AM. HIsT. 11
(1992); Robert E. Shalhope, Republicanism in American Historiography,39 Wm.& MARY
Q. 334 (1982); Robert E. Shalhope, Toward a Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of an
Understandingof Republicanism and Early American Historiography,29 WM. & MARY Q.
49 (1972).
In The PartialConstitution and We The People respectively, Sunstein and Ackerman
make a more concerted effort to deal with the sweep of the American constitutional past,
but their histories remain decidedly episodic, focussing on four key moments of constitutional contest and change: 1787, Reconstruction, Lochner, and 1937. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
FOUNDATIONS 37 (1991). Ackerman's principled defense of episodism ("Very few Americans feel the need to recall what happened in 1887, although it is a century closer to us in
chronological time [than 1787]. People constantly refer to the Reconstruction amendments, while nobody talks much about the constitutional significance of the Spanish-American War.") is also fraught with the dangers of presentism and anachronism, obscuring the
larger contexts and continuities of constitutional debate and struggle. See ACKERMAN,
supra, at 37.
Robert W. Gordon's brilliant historiographical trilogy is the definitive discussion of
the relevance of history for law and legal theory. See Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal
Histories,36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984); Robert W. Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017 (1981) [hereinafter Gordon, Historicism];Robert W. Gordon, Introduction: J. Willard Hurst and the Common Law Tradition in American Legal
Historiography,10 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 9 (1975).

April 1994]

COMMON REGULATION

The two pillars of the historical craft are sequence and context.
Historians study change over time, and embrace the complex interconnectedness of social developments. As a rule, historians challenge
timeless universalisms, ideologies that deny or disguise their contingent and human origins (e.g., the doctrine of natural law). By paying
close attention to sequence-by giving ideas, individuals, institutions,
and events worldly histories-historians battle reification and transcendence, the tendency of every established order to produce "the
naturalization of its own arbitrariness. '' 5 Similarly, historians tend to
eschew reductionist and overly determined models for divining essences and filtering out least common denominators (e.g., notions like
political or economic man), in favor of a methodology that emphasizes
the interrelatedness of economic, political, social, and legal phenomena. As Willard Hurst noted, "The content and energy which patterns
of behavior and ideas, feelings, and events impart to men's lives are
conditioned by the fact that these elements do not exist as isolated
entities. They coexist and interact."' 6 For historians, nothing human is
timeless or autonomous. Such a perspective is especially useful when
approaching something as embedded in history, politics, and social life
as American constitutional law.
These anti-foundational and anti-essentialist premises have led
some historians to talk about modem historical practice as an inherently destabilizing and subversive enterprise, a counter to the universalism of rationalist forms of apologetics. 7 The classic example of such
a critical use of history is C. Vann Woodward's The Strange Career of
Jim Crow. Through his historical recovery of a relatively flexible moment in post-Reconstruction race relations, Woodward challenged the
then-universal tenet that the roots of segregation lay in deep, unalterable Southern mores. 8 Applied to law, Robert Gordon has argued
5. PIERRE BouRDlnu, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE 164 (Richard Nice
trans., 1977).
6. JAMES WILLARD HuRsT, JusricE HOLMES ON LEGAL HISTORY 55 (1964).
7. See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, The HistoricalContingency of the Role of History, 90
YALE L.J. 1057 (1981).
8. C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIm CROW (1955). As Woodward elegantly put it:
My only purpose has been to indicate that things have not always been the same
in the South.... The policies of proscription, segregation, and disfranchisement
that are often described as the immutable "folkways" of the South, impervious
alike to legislative reform and armed intervention, are of a more recent origin.
The effort to justify them as a consequence of Reconstruction and a necessity of
the times is embarrassed by the fact that they did not originate in those times.
And the belief that they are immutable and unchangeable is not supported by
history.
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that historicism, defined as "the recognition of the historical and cultural contingency of law," is a "perpetual threat" to mainstream legal
scholarship and its on-going effort to rationalize, justify, and institutionalize current legal doctrine and practice. 9
Other philosophers, social scientists, and legal scholars have
taken "the historical turn" less for its intrinsic critical bite than as an
alternative to the excessive empiricism, positivism, and scientism of
current academic discussions of society and policy. James Kloppenberg has refined the notion of a pragmatic "historical sensibility"
that incorporates a more interpretive and hermeneutic approach to
knowledge. The patron saint of that perspective is Wilhelm Dilthey
who argued, "The development of historical consciousness destroys
faith in the universal validity of any philosophy which attempts to express world order cogently through a system of concepts."' 0 In place
of universal and apodictic philosophies, Dilthey advocated a more
skeptical, humanistic, and open-ended approach to the cultural sciences that recognized "meaning and significance arise only in man and
his history."" Though the focus of an enormous body of theoretical
WOODWARD, supra, at 47.

More recently, George Chauncey has demonstrated the critical power of revising
"taken-for-granted" sequences by deconstructing the received wisdom that the history of
homosexuality in America before 1969 was basically a story of isolation and invisibility
(i.e., the history of "the closet").

GEORGE CHAUNCEY, GAY NEW YORK: GENDER, URBAN CULTURE, AND THE MAKING OF THE GAY MALE WORLD, 1890-1940 (1994).

9. Gordon, Historicism, supra note 4, at 1017. These historians put to good use a
central insight of Hegel: "Philosophy aims at knowing what is imperishable, eternal, and
absolute. Its aim is truth. But history relates the sort of thing which has existed at one
time but at another has perished." JOHN PATRICK DIGGINs, THE PROMISE OF PRAGMATISM: MODERNISM AND THE CRISIS OF KNOWLEDGE AND AUTHORITY 10 (1994) (quoting

Hegel).
10. JAMES T. KLOPPENBERG, UNCERTAIN VICTORY: SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND PROGRESSIVISM IN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1870-1920, at 107-14 (1986) (quot-

ing Wilhelm Dilthey).
11. WILHELM DILTHEY, PATTERN AND MEANING IN HISTORY: THOUGHTS ON
TORY AND SOCIETY 168 (H.P. Rickman ed., 1961). Dilthey concluded this treatise:

HIS-

The historical consciousness of the finitude of every historical phenomenon, of
every human or social condition and of the relativity of every kind of faith, is the
last step towards the liberation of man. With it man achieves the sovereignty to
enjoy every experience to the full and surrender himself to it unencumbered, as if
there were no system of philosophy to tie him down. Life is freed from knowledge through concepts; the mind becomes sovereign over the cobwebs of dogmatic thought .... The attempt used to be made to grasp life through the world.
But there is only the one road from the interpretation of life to the world and life
is only there in experience, understanding and historical apprehension. We do
not carry the meaning of the world into life. We are open to the possibility that
meaning and significance arise only in man and his history, not in the isolated
individual but in man as a historical being. For man is something historical.
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literature and an intellectual debate as old as the separation of nomos
and physis, the gist of the historical sensibility is captured in a distinction Sheldon Wolin drew between political science and political

wisdom:
The antithesis between political wisdom and political science basically concerns. two different forms of knowledge. The scientific
form represents the search for rigorous formulations which are logically consistent and empirically testable. As a form, it has the qualities of compactness, manipulability, and relative independence of
context. Political wisdom... presents a contrast with the scientific
type. Its mode of activity is not so much the style of the search as of
reflection. It is mindful of logic, but more so of the incoherence and
contradictoriness of experience. For the same reason, it is distrustful of rigor. Political life does not yield its significance to terse hypotheses, but is elusive, and hence meaningful statements about it
often have to be allusive and intimative. Context becomes supremely important, for actions and events occur in no other setting.
Knowledge of this type tends, therefore; to be suggestive and illuminative rather than explicit and determinate. 12
Fittingly, Wolin recommends the study of history, institutions, law,
and past political theories as central to political wisdom. In this Article, I would like to take up Wolin's recommendation and urge a historical re-turn in American constitutional thought on the premise that
the late twentieth century might be in need of less constitutionalscience and more constitutional wisdom.

I.

Liberal Constitutionalism

A fitting place to begin such an enterprise is with a historical critique of the reigning paradigm of modem constitutional law-liberal
constitutionalism. That paradigm is the source of the current obsesId. at 167-68. For a classic discussion, see H. STUART HUGHES, CONSCIOUSNESS

AND

Soci-

ETY: THE REORIENTATION OF EUROPEAN SOCIAL THOUGHT, 1890-1930, at 183-248

(1958).

12. Sheldon Wolin, PoliticalTheory as a Vocation, in MACHIAVELLI AND THE NATURE
OF POLITICAL THouGHT 23,23-75 (Martin Fleisher ed., 1972). Some leading surveys of the
historical and interpretive turns are RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBCTlVISM AND
RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERMENEurics, AND PRAXIS (1985); INTERPRETIVE SOCIAL SCIENCE: A SECOND LOOK (Paul Rabinow & William M. Sullivan eds., 1987); UNDERSTANDING AND SOCIAL INQUIRY (Fred R. Dallmayr & Thomas A. McCarthy eds., 1977); Donald

R. Kelley, The Human Measure: Social Thought in the Western Legal Tradition(1990). On
the implications of this perspective for legal thought, the best source is Joan Williams's
trilogy of theoretical-historiographical articles. See Joan C. Williams, Rorty, Radicalism,
Romanticism: The Politics of the Gaze, 1992 Wis. L. Rnv. 131; Joan C. Williams, Culture
and Certainty: Legal History and the Reconstructive Project, 76 VA. L. REV. 713 (1990);
Joan C. Williams, CriticalLegal Studies: The Death of Transcendenceand the Rise of the
New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 429 (1987). -
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sion with the public-private distinction and the judicial balancing test
that spawned this Symposium. While self-evident to the modem lawyer, Justice Scalia's constitutional proposition that private right and
public value might be as incommensurable as the length of a line and
the weight of a rock 13 strikes a historian as novel, problematic, and in
need of a healthy dose of historicism.
Scalia's Carrollian metaphor constitutionally enshrines one particular way of breaking up and looking at the world-a way that has
come to represent the essence of modem liberal' 4 constitutionalism.

That perspective interprets the world in terms of a harsh, overarching
separation of the private and the public, the individual and the state.' 5
The dichotomy is total and the two are often conceived of as intrinsi6
cally antagonistic, as in Herbert Spencer's The Man Versus the State.'
Public powers, when confined to their legitimate and proper sphere,
are absolute and plenary. Private rights when correctly delineated are
inviolate and determinative. Judges obtain their distinctive political
authority in the American regime precisely because they are the ulti-

mate arbiters of these fundamental constitutional boundaries. The
balancing test-the careful drawing and re-drawing of the line between public values and individual rights-has become the sine qua
non of the judicial role. 17 Duncan Kennedy has described it as the
13. See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia.
J., concurring). Scalia's musing about rocks and lines is the source of this Symposium's
title, "When Is a Line as Long as a Rock Is Heavy?: Reconciling Public Values and Individual Rights in Constitutional Adjudication." The Symposium brochure speculates, "In
Wonderland, Alice would not have been at all surprised if she were asked to compare the
length of a line with the weight of a rock. Yet, the Constitution may invite just such a
comparison if it calls upon the Court to balance public values and individual liberties."
14. As will become clear below, I am using the word "liberal" here in its historical,
classical, and "negative" sense, as in John Stuart Mill's statement, "[T]he sole end for
which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of
action of any of their number is self-protection." JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978) (1859). Thus Scalia, while politically conservative, is a classic
liberal. See Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR EssAYs ON LIBERTY (Oxford
Univ. Press 1969) (1958); Louis HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA (1955).
On liberal legalism, see ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
MOVEMENT (1983).
15. See Morton J. Horwitz, The Publid/PrivateDistinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423
(1982) (discussing the origins of the public-private distinction in modem political and legal
thought).
16. HERBERT SPENCER, THE MAN VERSUS THE STATE (Truxton Beale ed., 1916).
17. For the best recent discussions of balancing pro and con, see Frank M. Coffin,
Judicial Balancing: The Protean Scales of Justice, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 16 (1988); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing,96 YALE LJ.943 (1987). For a
timely, if banal, example of just how far public and private balancing tests control modem
legal thinking and problem-solving, consult some of the arm-chair legal analysis resulting
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fundamental legitimating ideology behind the liberal rule of law.' 8 To

legal scholars these observations have the status of cant. They are
taken for granted as matter-of-factly representing the way that consti-

tutional jurisprudence is, should be, and always has been practiced.
For those who have passed through the looking-glass of modem legal
education, the public-private distinction and judicial balancing are as
natural, neutral, and necessary as "We The People.. ." itself.' 9
from the recent assault on figure skater Nancy Kerrigan. In speculating on whether or not
rival Tonya Harding would be dropped from the Olympic team, lawyer after lawyer employed the public-private template, suggesting subsequent litigation would turn on balancing the public's expectation and value of a fair, unblemished athletic competition against
Harding's private investment in her training and career with the expectation of a financial
payoff. CHANNEL 2 NEws (television broadcast, Jan. 20, 1994).
18. Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BuFF. L. REV.
209, 382 (1979). Kennedy introduces a wonderful diagram to illustrate the conceptual
power of a "rule of law" as mediator between the individual and state (public law), and
between clashing individual rights (private law):
INDIVIDUALS
LAW

STATE

POLITICS

The Police

Soeigt

Absolute
Legal
Rights of A
Natua
Absolute
Legal
Rights of Ber

KThe
Rule
of Law
In positing a pre-social, highly individualistic concept of the self and a rigid separation of
public and private, the liberal world view empowers law (when it can successfully legitimate itself as something other than power or politics) as the ultimate umpire of social
relations and an all-powerful border police. In the liberal schema, the "rule of law" becomes the only thing protecting an individual from the violence of others as well as the
state. Thus, even a staunch critic of liberalism like E.P. Thompson could conclude that
"the notion of the rule of law is itself an unqualified human good." E.P. THOMPSON,
WHIGS AND HuNTERs: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLAcK Acr 267 (1975). But see Morton Horwitz, The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Human Good?, 86 YALE L.J. 561 (1977) (criticizing
the rule of law). The central problem with Kennedy's analysis is his assertion that Blackstone marks the ascendancy of a liberal legalism that by the nineteenth century structured
all of Anglo-American law. As suggested below, one could argue that Kennedy's diagram
and liberal legalism failed to capture American jurisprudence until the early twentieth century (Kennedy's date for liberalism's "final disintegration"). Kennedy, supra, at 217.
19. Morton Horwitz is the original source of the alliterative "natural, neutral, and
necessary" which he uses to stand for the hegemonic and naturalizing tendencies of all
mainstream legal thought. See MORTON J. HoRwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERIcAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRisis OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 6 (1992) [hereinafter HoRwriz,
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The historian's job is to challenge this misconception. Far from
being either natural, necessary, or the way things have been from time
out of mind, the public-private antinomy and judicial balancing are
surprisingly recent and contingent human creations, social constructions of a particular historical moment. Liberal constitutionalism is a
modern legal invention, the culmination of a complex and important
set of social and political struggles. How we conceptualize the historical emergence of liberal constitutionalism-how we frame its original
sequence and context-has enormous consequences for the way we
think about judicial power, constitutional interpretation, and the supposed irreconcilability of public values and private rights.
As expected, the dominant, assumed version of American constitutional history is remarkably conducive to the liberal bifurcation of
public and private, powers and rights. It offers comfort and legitimacy
to the liberal legal order by providing it with deep, consensual roots in
the American past. Though examples are legion, the father of this
perspective is Edward S. Corwin.20 In a series of authoritative articles
in the early twentieth century, Corwin reduced the essence of American constitutionalism to a triumvirate of sacred doctrines: vested
rights, judicial review, and due process. Those doctrines were rooted
in a higher law tradition as old as western civilization that happily
realized its telos in the hands of the Founders, John Marshall, and
Joseph Story.21 From that tradition flowed the principledness and
rightness of American constitutionalism's "basic doctrine" of shielding
private rights from legislative attack via a powerful, independent judiciary. Of course, definitions of private right and legislative power
changed significantly from the nineteenth to the twentieth century.
Private right grew from a narrow, propertied conception to modem
notions of personal liberty and civil rights. The locus of public power
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY]. Cass Sunstein has recently domesticated and harnessed

this central Legal Realist and Critical Legal Studies insight for peaceful, liberal purposes in
supra note 4.
20. For the most recent statement in the Corwinian tradition, see JENNIFER NEDEL-

THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION,

SKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONALISM: THE
MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY (1990). For an excellent review essay, see

also Fisher, supra note 4.
21. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1955); Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law
Before the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 366, 460 (1911); Edward S. Corwin, Marbury v.
Madison and the Doctrine of Judicial Review, 12 MICH. L. REV. 538 (1914); Edward S.

Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of American ConstitutionalLaw, 12 MICH.L. REV. 247 (1914).
An overview of Corwin's basic position can be found in EDWARD S. CORWIN, LIBERTY
AGAINST GOVERNMENT: THE RISE, FLOWERING AND DECLINE OF A FAMOUS JURIDICAL
CONCEPT

(1948).
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shifted from the states to the federal government. But for Corwin and

his progeny, constitutionalism remained consistently dedicated to
drawing and re-drawing the line between public and private, power
and right, political sovereignty and fundamental law, protecting the
latter from the former. That was the tradition, Carl Swisher noted,

"from Demosthenes to Calvin Coolidge and beyond." Justice Scalia is
only too clearly implicated in that "beyond."
In the following pages, I argue that this legitimationist view of
constitutional history is flawed. 22 In contrast to its linear portrayal of
an American constitutionalism, continuously devoted to the judicial
delimitation and protection of a vital private sphere, I make the case

for discontinuity and diversity. Despite some recent arguments to the
contrary, American constitutional history from 1787 to 1937 is not re-

ducible to the elaboration of a single doctrine or principle (e.g., Jennifer Nedelsky's protection of property, Herbert Hovenkamp's
advancement of classical economic theory, or Morton Horwitz's aggrandizement of legal and judicial power).23 There have been several
competing constitutionalisms in the American past.2 4 The modem,
liberal version is only the most recently ascendant. It did not evolve
naturally out of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century ideas and practices, but overthrew and displaced them.
In a larger work-in-progress, I argue that the early nineteenth
century was anything but the formative era of modem constitutional-

ism. Instead, it was home to understandings of public law, individual
responsibility, and judicial role decidedly different from our own. A
22. Of course, I am not the first to make such an argument. American legal historians
have been wrestling with various aspects of the Corwin thesis since Willard Hurst's famous
distinction between static and dynamic property rights. JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW
AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES (1956)
[hereinafter HURST, CONDrTONs OF FREEDOM]. I discuss some of these historiographical
moves in my Public Economy and the Well-Ordered Market: Law and Economic Regulation in 19th-CenturyAmerica, 18 LAw & Soc. INOUIRY 1, 3-7 (1993). For a more complete
survey, see Harry N. Scheiber, American ConstitutionalHistory and the New Legal History:
Complementary Themes in Two Modes, 68 J. AM. HIsT. 337 (1981).
23. See NEDELSKY, supra note 20; HERBERT HoVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937 (1991); MORTON J. HORWvTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAW, 1780-1860 (1977) [hereinafter HoRwTz, TRANSFORMATION]; HoRwrrz, CRISIS OF
LEGAL ORTHODOXY, supra note 19. More convincing is the recent effort of Chris Tomlins
to build a synthesis around the more substantively flexible notion of law as "a modality of
rule." See CHRISTOPHER L. ToMLINs, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1993) (especially pp. 19-97).
24. See Hendrik Hartog, The Constitutionof Aspiration and "The Rights That Belong
to Us All", 74 3. AM. HIsr. 1013 (1987); Michael Grossberg, Social History Update: "Fighting Faiths" and the Challenges of Legal History, 28 J. Soc. HisT. 191 (1991).
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classic example of that foreignness is Massachusetts Chief Justice
Lemuel Shaw's defense of legislative power in Commonwealth v.
Alger:
We think it is a settled principle, growing out of the nature of well
ordered civil society, that every holder of property... holds it under
the implied liability that his use of it may be so regulated, that it
shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an
equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the
rights of the community. All property in this commonwealth.. . is
derived directly or indirectly from the government, and held subject
to those regulations, which are necessary to the common good and
general welfare. Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in their
enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such
reasonable restraints and regulations established by law, as the legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested
in them
25
by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient.
Shaw's references to "the nature of well ordered civil society," "the
rights of the community," and "social and conventional rights" of
property clash sharply with common assumptions about the liberal,
higher-law core of early American constitutionalism. They suggest instead the outlines of a different vision of law and society that governed public legal discourse and controversy well into the late
nineteenth century; a vision that distinctly refused to separate public
powers and private rights in favor of an over-arching notion of "wellordered" and "well-regulated" community, in which liberties and
powers, rights and duties were mutually interwoven. 2 6 Such ideas
were dislodged by modern liberal ones only after a veritable constitutional and legal revolution.
A complete contextual and sequential refutation of the supposedly deep roots of liberal constitutionalism is beyond the scope of this
Article. Let me narrow the task at hand in three ways. First, the analysis that follows is primarily synchronic. Before one can argue about
the reasons for the rise of one regime (liberalism) and the demise of
another (the well-regulated society), one must establish the distinctiveness of those regimes in the first place. Thus, my priority here is to
illuminate "the well-regulated society" as a coherent, alternative nineteenth-century constitutionalism, not to chart the transition to
liberalism.
25.

Commonwealth v. Alger, 62 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 84-85 (1851).

26.

WILLIAM J. NOVAK, INTELLECrUAL ORIGINS OF THE STATE POLICE POWER: THE
COMMON LAW VISION OF A WELL-REGULATED SocIETY (University of Wisconsin Legal

History Working Paper No. 3-2, 1989).
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Secondly, I narrow the relevant context by paying particular attention to legal doctrine. Legal doctrine is important, and historians
have staunchly defended a focus on treatise writers and appellate
judges as an appropriate, relatively autonomous unit for legal-historical study.27 Nonetheless, it is impossible to fully grasp the import of a
common-law doctrine like overruling necessity without taking into account the larger social context of early American urban life (e.g., a
propensity for catastrophic epidemics and fires). For the sake of brevity, however, such contexts will have to remain implicit.
Finally, and most importantly, the rest of this Article will focus
solely on the nature of state power in nineteenth-century America (ignoring for the time-being the equally compelling question of nineteenth-century conceptions of rights).28 In contrast to liberal
assumptions about laissez-faire and the "night-watchman," or negative state, public power was alive and well in the nineteenth century.
And it existed in public law as something more than a pragmatic, judicial counterbalance to individual rights. The phrase "common regulation" is meant to capture both its presence and its distinctiveness. Let
me unpack the meaning of this phrase by. treating its two halves
individually.
H. Regulation
Despite a vast academic literature and constant public usage,
"regulation" defies close circumscription. Indeed, it is rarely dealt
with as an independent concept. In its most general form-controlling, directing, or governing by rules---"regulation" is almost useless
as an analytical tool for deciphering and distinguishing forms of governmental action. It becomes synonymous with anything and every27. See, e.g., MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMIN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1985); Robert W. Gordon, CriticalLegal Histories, supra note 4 (discussing Critical Legal Studies and history).
28. Early American conceptions of rights, like powers, differed markedly from modem liberal notions as well as from traditional ideas about "natural law." As Nathaniel
Chipman put it in 1833, "[The rights of man are all relative to his social nature, and...
exist, in a coincidence only with the rights of the whole, in a well ordered state of society
and civil government." NATHANIEL CHIPMAN, PRINCIPLES OF GOvERNMENT: A TREATISE
ON FREE INSTITIrONS INCLUDING THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 66 (1833).
The legal-historical sources of nineteenth-century rights language are distinctive and diverse. Citizenship is central. For some hints see Linda K. Kerber, The Paradox of Women's Citizenship in the Early Republic: The Case of Martin v. Massachusetts, 1805, 97
AM. HisT. REv. 349 (1992); Margaret R. Somers, Rights, Relationality,and Membership:
Rethinking the Making and Meaning of Citizenship, 19 LAW & Soc. INQuIRY 63 (1994);
Suzanna Sherry, Public Values and Private Virtue, 45 HAsTINGs LJ. 1099 (1994).
ILY
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thing government does. From that perspective, the Constitution,
Northwest Ordinance, Sherman Antitrust Act, and NIRA are equal
examples of public regulation. Yet more specific renderings of "regulation" run the risk of anachronistically imposing modern constructions on an unsuspecting and diverse past.29 Nevertheless, there are at
least two models of regulation that serve as useful guides (or foils) in
illuminating the character and historiographical significance of nineteenth-century public policymaking.
The first and most unsophisticated model of regulation-the
"classical" model-equates regulation with the state and counterposes
the state to a free and private market (economic or social). More a
general tendency in some scholarship than a clearly expressed position, this model thrives on the juxtaposition of ideal types: laissezfaire and the general welfare state, public and private, and the state
and individual. Regulation is the artificial intervention of the state or
the public realm in the autonomous happenings of private life (i.e.,
interference with private property, the free market, or individual
rights).3 0 The sources of this approach to regulation are diverse,
rooted in the dominant paradigms of American politics and economics: self-interested liberalism and the free market. Its fit with liberal
constitutionalism should be apparent.
For our purposes, the most important aspect of the classical
model is its historical dynamic. It is usually embedded in a narrative
wherein the United States moves to regulation only after a nineteenth
century characterized by laissez-faire, free enterprise, and a lack of
governmental initiatives. 31 Examples of this perspective abound in
some of the best recent work on the American state. Stephen
Skowronek's much heralded study of public administration posits a
'"sense of statelessness" that permeated early American political de29. For an example of this, see
REGULATION:

BARRY M. MITNICK, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF

CREATING, DESIGNING,

AND REMOVING REGULATORY FORMS

(1980).

While Mitnick deserves credit for taking the problem of conceptualization seriously, his

understanding of regulation as "interference" is so bound up with modem political and
philosophical debates about the state and the market that it may be harmful to historians.
30. For inklings of this approach, see id. at 2-7; James W. McKie, Regulation and the
Free Market: The Problem of Boundaries, 1 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 6 (1970).

31. See, e.g., SIDNEY FINE, LAISSEZ FAIRE AND THE GENERAL-WELFARE STATE: A
STUDY OF CONFLICT IN AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1865-1901 (1956); ARTHUR SELWYN
MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN CAPITALISM (1968); Wallace D. Farnham,
"The Weakened Spring of Government": A Study in Nineteenth-Century American History,
68 AM. HIsT. REV. 662 (1963). Though he draws more on English than American sources,

see also Calvin Woodard, Reality and Social Reform: The Transitionfrom Laissez-Faireto
the Welfare State, 72 YALE L.J. 286 (1962).
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velopment. 32 A renaissance of work on the American state focuses
almost exclusively on national authority, administrative agencies, and
post-1887 development. 33 The implication is that public activity in the
states, outside the "fourth branch of government," or before the Civil

War, was insignificant.
Of course, this is not the only model of regulation in America,
and its assumptions (historical and conceptual) have not gone uncontested. First, a vast historical literature, from the "commonwealth
studies" of Oscar and Mary Handlin and Louis Hartz to the legal histories of Willard Hurst, Leonard Levy, and Harry Scheiber, has sub-

verted the conception of a nineteenth century devoid of state action.34

Through detailed investigations of the policies of state legislatures,
32.

STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A

NEW

AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF

NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920, at 5 (1982). Skowronek labels insti-

tutional development as late as 1900 "patchwork."
33. See Thomas K. McCraw, Regulation in America: A Review Article, 49 Bus. HiST.
REV. 159 (1975); THOMAS K. MCCRAw, PROPHETS OF REGULATION (1984); see also
BARRY D. KARL, THE UNEASY STATE: THE UNITED STATES FROM 1915 TO 1945 (1983);
MORTON KELLER, REGULATING A NEW ECONOMY (1990); MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF
STATE: PUBLIC LIFE IN LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (1977) (especially chs. 9-

11); Charles C. Bright, The State in the United States During the Nineteenth Century, in
STATEMAKING AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 121 (Charles Bright & Susan Harding eds., 1984);
Morton Keller, The PluralistState: American Economic Regulation in Comparative Perspective, 1900-1930, in REGULATION IN PERSPECTrIVE 56 (Thomas K. McCriaw ed., 1981);
Theda Skocpol and John Ikenberry, The PoliticalFormation of the American Welfare State
in Historicaland Comparative Perspective, 6 COMP. Soc. RES. 87 (1983). On the "renaissance" generally, see Theda Skocpol, Bringingthe State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in
Current Research, in BRINGING THE STATE BACK IN 3 (Peter B. Evans et al. eds., 1985);
William E. Leuchtenberg, The Pertinence of Political History: Reflections on the Significance of the State in America, 73 J. Am. HIsr. 585 (1986).
34. The best of the commonwealth studies are CARTER GOODRICH, GOVERNMENT
PROMOTION OF AMERICAN CANALS AND RAILROADS, 1800-1890 (1960); OSCAR & MARY
A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE
AMERICAN ECONOMY: MASSACHUSETTS, 1774-1861 (1947); Louis HARTZ, ECONOMIC
POLICY AND DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT: PENNSYLVANIA, 1776-1860 (1948); GERALD D.
NASH, STATE GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT- A HISTORY OF ADMINISFLUG HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH:

1849-1933 (1964). It is hard to get an idea of the full
import of this school without also including the work of Harry Scheiber on the Ohio canal
era, Milton Heath, Bray Hammond, James Neal Primm, George Miller, Paul Gates, and
Edwin M. Dodd. For fuller bibliographical summaries and analyses, see Robert A. Lively,
The American System: A Review Article, 29 Bus. HIST. REV. 91 (1955); Harry N. Scheiber,
Government and the Economy: Studies of the "Commonwealth" Policy in Nineteenth-Century America, 3 J. INTERDISCIPLINARY HisT. 135 (1972). The legal histories most concerned with the commonwealth theme are HURST, CONDrTONS OF FREEDOM, supra note
22; LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW
(1957); and the voluminous articles of Harry N. Scheiber, including Harry N. Scheiber,
Property Law, Expropriation,and Resource Allocation by Government: the United States,
1789-1910, 33 J. EcoN. HIsT. 232 (1973); Harry N. Scheiber, Public Rights and the Rule of
Law in American Legal History, 72 CAL. L. REV. 217 (1984); Scheiber, The Road to Munn:
TRATIVE POLICIES IN CALIFORNIA,
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courts, and judges, these studies uncover a beehive of public activity

before the Civil War, from state promotion of canals and railroads to
public lands and eminent domain policies to experiments in mixed and
public enterprises. Together, these studies thoroughly demolish the

myth of laissez-faire and make it very difficult to insist on the "statelessness" of early America.
The conceptual challenge to the classical model comes from a recognition that not all "state interventions" are equal. A fundamental
difference in kind separates the governmental activities of levying

property taxes, distributing public lands, and prohibiting the sale of
liquor or dangerous materials. Though perhaps always noticed, it
took Ernst Freund's pioneering studies of law and legislation to
clearly demarcate these distinctions for American lawyers and scholars.35 Freund divided governmental power into four "manifestations":
justice, police, taxation, and management of public property and personnel.36 Though all four contained residues of "regulation" as rules
and controls, Freund identified police as the power chiefly associated
with the idea of "regulation. '3 7 He defined police as the state's power

to promote the public welfare through statutes and rules restraining
and restricting "the use of liberty and property.
'3 9
this regulatory authority the "police power.

'38

Freund labelled

Freund's typology and definition of regulation are much more
useful than the intervention-nonintervention model in evaluating public powers. And modern historians and political scientists have been
quick to borrow and elaborate his separation of governmental powers.
Eminent Domain and the Concept of Public Purpose in the State Courts, 5 PERSP. AM.
HIST. 327 (1971).
35. ERNST FREUND, LEGISLATIVE REGULATION: A STUDY OF THE WAYS AND
MEANS OF WRITTEN LAW (1932) [hereinafter FREUND, LEGISLATIVE REGULATION];
ERNST FREUND, STANDARDS OF AMERICAN LEGISLATION (1917) [hereinafter FREUND,
STANDARDS]; ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (1904) [hereinafter FREUND, POLICE POWER].
36. FREUND. LEGISLATIVE REGULATION, supra note 35, at 53.

37.

Id.

38. FREUND, POLICE POWER, supra note 35, at iii.
39. Id. at 21. The police power entailed the imposition of direct and explicit limitations on private behavior not found in taxation or land policies. Furthermore, police restraints and compulsions operated on conventional and legitimate behavior rather than the
"intrinsically vicious" or evil acts regulated by criminal justice. As Freund admits, this is
perhaps the trickiest distinction in that most police legislation is enforced through criminal
penalties and thus is technically a part of the criminal law. Nevertheless, Freund's typology
addresses the need to distinguish the criminal sanction against murder from that attending
a violation of anti-trust laws. His notion of "intrinsic" criminality versus the more "conventional" restraints of regulatory law is perhaps overdrawn, yet it usefully highlights the
more contentious, policy-oriented nature of police legislation.
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Theodore Lowi is perhaps the most influential of Freund's embelfishers. 40 Like Freund, Lowi advocated a stricter definition of regulation (or police power) as a particular kind of governmental activity
involving restraints and restrictions on private conduct. Lowi used
this notion to differentiate regulation from distributive and redistributive policies. In contrast to regulation, "distributive" policies entailed
the promotion of development by granting or giving away resources
and privileges to individuals and groups. Public land policies as well
as the fevered grants of corporate charters and franchises, tax exemptions, eminent domain privileges, and other immunities or subsidies in
the early nineteenth century were perfect examples of distributive
government. 41 Lowi used "redistribution" to stand for the welfare
policies of the post-New Deal years whereby resources were transferred on a grand scale from one social group to another.
Unfortunately, despite this closer scrutiny of kinds of governmental policies, the categories and definitions devised by Freund and Lowi
did not challenge the periodization or basic story-line of the classical
model and the laissez-faire historians. In place of the evolution from
laissez-faire to state intervention and regulation, Freund and Lowi
simply presented a nineteenth-century policy-making shift from distribution to regulation. Regulation remained a distinct product of the
late nineteenth century. Lowi argued for the historical as well as functional distinction between distribution and regulation, distribution
"being almost the exclusive type of national domestic policy from 1789
until virtually 1890."42 In 1904, Freund similarly concluded, "The law
of the police power [the essence of his concept of regulation] is practi'43
cally a growth of the last thirty or forty years.
The Freund-Lowi model of regulation remains the dominant interpretive paradigm of American political and constitutional history.
The commonwealth studies, together with some of the new initiatives
of legal historians, portray an early nineteenth century bustling with
government activity but devoid of truly "regulatory" state action.
Rather, the emphasis of policy after the Revolution is on the "opening
up" of opportunities and the releasing of creative economic energies

40. See, e.g., Theodore J. Lowi, American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and
Political Theory, 16 WORLD POL. 677 (1964).
41. See Richard L. McCormick, The Party Periodand Public Policy: An Exploratory
Hypothesis, 66 J. AM. HisTr. 279, 283-84 (1979).
42. Lowi, supra note 40, at 689.
43. FREuND, POLICE POWER, supra note 35, at v.
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through policies best understood as "distributive." 44 Though these
studies ably critique the laissez-faire theory of nineteenth-century
government, they cling to the notion that regulation was rare before
the Gilded Age. Richard L. McCormick has summed up a consensus
about public power in the nineteenth century: "Forever giving things
away, governments were laggard in regulating the economic activities
they subsidized. . . . 'Policy' was little more than the accumulation of
isolated, individual choices, usually of a distributive nature. '45
The concept of "common regulation" challenges this notion of a
young America, free of serious regulatory effort. In contrast to liberal
mythology, the early American Constitution was devoted to much
more than the protection and distribution of natural rights and private
privileges. Despite the gradual loosening of some feudal vestiges, like
primogeniture and imprisonment for debt, public regulatory power remained an omnipresent factor in early nineteenth-century economic,
political, and social life. Indeed, the portrait of a stateless America,
characterized by patronage, bargain basement giveaways of natural
and man-made (i.e., charters, monopoly privileges, limited liability,
etc.) resources, a "paucity of planning," and little restrictive regulation
or oversight, is seriously challenged by a deluge of state and local legislation regulatingeconomic and social life. Between 1781 and 1801,
for example, the New York legislature passed special laws regulating
lotteries; hawkers and peddlers; the firing of guns; usury; frauds; the
buying and selling of offices; beggars and disorderly persons; rents and
leases; firing woods; the destruction of deer; stray cattle and sheep;
mines; ferries; apprentices and servants; bastards; idiots and lunatics;
counsellors, attorneys and solicitors; travel, labor, or play on Sunday;
cursing and swearing; drunkenness; the exportation of flaxseed; gaming; the inspection of lumber; dogs; the culling of staves and heading;
debtors and creditors; the quarantining of ships; sales by public auction; stock jobbing; fisheries; the inspection of flour and meal; the
practice of physic and surgery; the packing and inspection of beef and
pork; sole leather; strong liquors, inns, and taverns; pot and pearl
ashes; poor relief; highways; and quit rents. 46 Most of these regulations were passed while the legislature was also busy re-formulating
the basic institutions and infrastructure of state government: elections, legislative sessions, courts, towns, sheriffs, the militia, basic
44.

ROBERT

H. WIEBE,

THE OPENING OF AMERICAN SOCIETY: FROM THE ADOPTION

OF THE CONSTITUTION TO THE EVE OF DISUNION (1984); Bright, supra note 33, at 121-23.

45.

McCormick, supra note 41, at 284-85.

46.

See LAws OF NEw YORK, 1781-1801 (1802).
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criminal laws, weights and measures, land laws, banks, turnpikes, and
bridges.

This regulatory pattern continued well into the nineteenth century. Like many states, Michigan revised its statutes in the late
1830s.47 Under familiar titles and headings, the state organized its
regulations of (a) highways, bridges, and ferries; (b) trade (including
the inspection and regulation of beef, pork, butter, fish, flour and
meal, leather, pot and pearl ashes, beer and ale, and staves and heading; 48 the licensing and regulation of auctions; and weights and measures); (c) public health (including regulations for quarantines, the
removal of nuisances, offensive trades, contaminated vessels, homes
or buildings, the burial of the dead, travellers, boards of health, medi47. See REVISED STATUTES OF MICHIGAN (1838). Similar provisions can be found in
THE REVISED STATUTES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS (1836).
48. The requirements for each of these products mirror the detail of the regulation of
beef (though the antebellum buyer of beef should still beware, this hardly looks like caveat
emptor to me):
All barrels in which beef or pork shall be packed, shall be made of good seasoned
white oak or white ash staves and heading, free from every defect; and each barrel shall contain two hundred pounds of beef or pork. Such barrels shall measure
seventeen and a half inches between the chimes, and be twenty-nine inches long,
and hooped with twelve good hickory, white oak, or other substantial hoops; if
the barrel be made of ash staves, it shall be hooped with at least fourteen hoops;
the staves and heads shall be made a proper thickness, and the hoops shall be well
set and driven together, and the barrels shall be branded on the bilge with at least
the initial letters of the cooper's name.... No beef shall be packed in barrels or
half barrels, for sale or exportation, unless it be of fat cattle not under three years
old; and all such beef shall be cut into pieces, as nearly square as may be, and of
not more than twelve, nor less than four pounds in weight. All beef which an
inspector shall find on examination to have been killed at a proper age, and to be
fat and merchantable, shall be sorted and divided for packing or repacking, in
barrels and half barrels, into three different sorts, to be denominated 'mess,'
'prime,' and 'cargo' beef. Mess beef shall consist of the choice pieces of such beef
as are large and well fatted, without hocks, shanks, clods or necks, and may or
may not contain two choice rounds out of the same cattle, not exceeding ten
pounds each: and each barrel or half barrel containing beef of this description,
shall be branded on one of the heads with the words 'mess beef.' [Similar descriptions for prime and cargo beef follow.] Every barrel of beef shall be well salted
with seventy-five pounds of good Thrks Island salt, or a sufficient quantity of
other salt to be equal thereto, exclusive of a strong new pickle; and to each barrel
shall be added four ounces of saltpetre. On the head of every barrel and half
barrel of merchantable beef and pork, inspected and packed, shall be distinctly
branded the weight it contains, with the first letter of the christian name, and the
surname at full length, of the inspector or deputy who shall have inspected the
same, the word 'MICHIGAN,' and the name of the county and the year in which
the same was inspected and branded.
REVISED STATUTES OF MICIoAN, supra note 47, at 136-38. Extensive penalties are then
listed for fraud, neglect, unlawful brands, intermixing, or offering for sale beef contrary to
the provisions of this law. See iUL
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cal societies, physic, and surgery); (d) the internal police of the state
49
(including regulations for paupers and the poor, disorderly persons,

taverns and other licensed houses, illegitimate children, Sunday observance, the law of the road and public carriages, the firing of woods
and prairies, timber on water and land, lost goods and stray beasts,

theatrical exhibitions and public shows, gunpowder, and unauthorized
banking); and (e) corporations. In addition, separate criminal provisions helped restrain such conduct as obstructing highways, railroads
or rivers; duelling, defrauding or cheating at common law; unlawfully
assembling or rioting; the importing and selling of obscene books or

prints; exciting disturbance at public meetings or elections; and selling
corrupt or unwholesome provisions. 50
In addition to these state regulations, municipalities were usually

incorporated with ample powers to pass regulations of their own. A
perfect example are the extensive "police" powers granted to the city
of Albany by the New York legislature. An 1826 statute haphazardly
lumps together some of the regulatory powers of the common council
for the "more effectual suppression of vice and immorality" and "for
preserving peace and good order."'51 Included are hundreds of regulatable offenses, actions, professions, and economic interests: fore-

stalling; regrating; disorderly and gaming houses; billiard tables;
combustible and dangerous materials; the use of lights and candles in
livery or other stables; the construction of fireplaces, hearths, chim-

neys, stoves, and any other apparatus capable of causing fires; the
gauging of all casks of liquids and liquors; the place and manner of
selling hay, pickled and other fish; the forestalling of poultry, butter,
49. Again, the detail of these regulations is crucial. Regulated under the heading of
"disorderly persons" are:
All persons who threaten to run away and leave their wives and children a burden
on the public; all persons pretending to tell fortunes, or where lost or stolen goods
may be found; all common prostitutes, all keepers of bawdy houses, or houses for
the resort of prostitutes; all drunkards, tipplers, gamesters or other disorderly persons; all persons who have no visible profession or calling to maintain themselves
by, but who do for the most part support themselves by gaming; all jugglers, common showmen and mountebanks, who exhibit or perform for profit and puppetshow, wire or rope dancing, or other idle shows, arts or feats; all persons who
keep in any public highway, or in any place where spirituous liquors are sold, any
keno table, wheel of fortune, thimblers, or other table, box, machine or device for
the purpose of gaming; all persons who go about with such table, wheel, or other
machine or device, exhibiting tricks or gaming therewith; all persons who play in
the public streets or highways, with cards, dice, or any instrument or device for
gaming; shall be deemed disorderly persons.
Id. at 199.
50. See id. at 619-51.

51.

LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

chs. 185 & 191 (1826).

April 1994]

COMMON REGULATION

and eggs; the purchase of wheat, corn, every kind of grain, and other

articles of country produce, by "runners"; the running of dogs; weights
and measures; buildings; chimneys and chimney sweeps; roads;
wharves and docks; the weighing and measuring of hay, fish, iron, cord
wood, coal, grain, lime, and salt; markets; cartmen and porters; fires;
highways and bridges; roof guards and railings; the selling of cakes
and fruit; the paving or flagging of sidewalks; the assize and quality of
bread; the running-at-large of horses, cows, or cattle; and vagrants,

common mendicants, or street beggars. In addition, the legislature authorized Albany's common council "to make all rules, by-laws, and
52
regulations for the good order and government of the said city."
Lists such as these could be multiplied a hundredfold across the
various jurisdictions of nineteenth-century America. Moreover, each
item listed is more than likely the focus of scores of more particular
regulations and specifications. 5 3 I have risked tiring the reader with
52. Id. at 193.
53. A telling example is the regulation of ferriage rates. An 1810 New York statute
regulation the New York City-Nassau Island ferry is typical:
For every fat ox, steer or bull, twenty-five cents, for all other neat cattle eighteen
cents, the ferry-master to find the necessary head ropes to fasten and secure the
cattle in the boats; for every dead calf, hog or sheep, two cents; for every lamb,
pig or shote, one cent; for every quarter of beef, three cents; for every firkin of
butter, lard or tallow, two cents; for every other package of butter, lard or tallow,
per cwt. three cents; for every ham, an half cent; for every bale of cotton or wool,
ten cents; for every crate of earthen ware, twelve cents and an half; for every bear
skin, dry hide or horse skin, an half cent; for every cask of flax seed, dry beans or
pease of seven bushels, seven cents; for every hundred oysters or clams, one cent;
for every sheaf of straw, an half cent; for every one horse chaise with standing
top, thirty-one cents; for every hundred bricks, six cents; for every full trunk or
chest four feet long, six cents; three feet long four cents; for every full trunk or
chest two feet long, two cents, all under, one cent; for every empty trunk or chest
of the above sizes, half the above rates; for every bookcase or cupboard, twentyfive cents; for every secretary, bookcase or chest of drawers, twenty cents; for
every mahogany dining table, eights cents; for every tea or card table, four cents;
of other kind of wood, half of the above rates; for every piano forte, twenty cents;
for every mahogany bedstead, four cents; of other wood, two cents; for every
clock and case, twenty-five cents; for every sideboard, thirty-seven cents and an
half; for every mahogany settee, twenty cents; of other wood, six cents; for every
feather bed, three cents; for every cat-tail or straw bed, one cent; for every matrass of hair or wool, two cents; for every looking glass the plate six feet long, fifty
cents; five feet long or upwards, eight cents; three feet, six cents; two feet, two
cents; all under, one cent; for every chaldron of coals, fifty cents; for every cord of
nutwood, eighty cents; for every cord of oak or other wood, seventy cents; for
every kettle of mild of eight gallons or upwards, two cents; for every empty milk
kettle, one cent; for every musket or fowling piece, one cent; for every large or
horse boat of household furniture where a single boat is required, one hundred
and fifty cents; for every ton of hemp or flax, sixty-two cents and an half; for every
ton of cordage, sixty-two cents and an half; for every ream of paper one cent; for
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extensive excerpts and inventories to physically confront regulation's

absence in our historiography with the sheer weight of its presence in
nineteenth-century law. My first theme is simple and unoriginal, but
nonetheless important: Regulation was certainly there in the early
nineteenth century.
111.

Common

If the "regulation" in "common regulation" draws us to the familiar in early nineteenth-century public policy, "common" represents
my attempt to emphasize its distinctive, foreign, and perhaps un-

representable features. It is part of an effort to tell the tale of nineteenth-century constitutionalism from the inside out, from the past
forward, emphasizing the concerns, ambitions, and technologies of

public action central to nineteenth- rather than twentieth-century
Americans.5 4 This would seem to be an obvious historicist point, were
not histories of public regulation in America plagued with an over-

whelming tendency to read history backwards, with one eye ever cast
on the forthcoming New Deal and welfare state. 55 Such a presentist
every fruit or other tree more than six or less than ten feet long, an half cent; all
under, one quarter cent; flowers or shrubs in pots or boxes, an half cent; for every
corpse of an adult, twenty-five cents; of children, twelve cents and an half; for
every cheese, one quarter cent; for every dog, four cents; for every hundred of
pipe staves or heading, fifteen cents; for every hundred of hogshead staves or
heading, twelve cents and an half; for every hundred of barrel staves or heading,
eight cents; for every hundred weight of hay, ten cents.
PUBLIC LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK chs. 119 & 37 (1810).
54. I owe the concept of "technologies of public action" to HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN
AMERICAN LAW, 1730-1870, at 66 (1983).

55. The New Deal has plagued especially one of the most remarkable efforts in
American public history, the "commonwealth studies." Without question the work of the
Committee on Research in Economic History was directly influenced by the New Deal (as
noted by Oscar and Mary Flug Handlin in the 1968 revised edition of COMMONWEALTH: A
STUDY OF THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: MASSACHUSETTS,

1774-1861 viii-xii (rev. ed. 1969)). This perspective led them to privilege highly visible
examples of government-business cooperation, TVA-like efforts at public ownership and
development, and the state's orientation towards general economic management and direction. Those efforts that resonated most with New Deal initiatives received greatest attention, while more subtle (but perhaps more historically lucrative) examples of state
power (e.g., the common law of nuisance, the police power, municipal regulatory ordinances) were neglected. The result is a conception of state government in the early nineteenth century that FDR's "Brain Trust" would not find completely alien. Accusations of
presentism, in other words, were not altogether undeserved. On the other hand, dismissive
attitudes have resulted in the neglect of some of the greatest substantive discoveries of this
body of work. For a listing of the commonwealth literature and commentary, see supra
note 34.
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orientation results in the neglect of the unfamiliar and the forcing of
the familiar into anachronistic categories and frameworks.5 6 Indeed, a

prime reason why historians have had trouble recognizing or dealing
with public power in the early republic is that it refuses to conform to
modem expectations or understandings.
My second theme, then, is no more complex than the first:
Though certainly there, early nineteenth-century regulation was different. It did not carry with it the same assumptions and intellectual baggage that energize contemporary regulatory policy. To get. at this
difference, we must hold our own conceptions of regulation, rights,
and law at bay while sympathetically searching for the period's endemic definitions and orderings. By "common regulation," I hope to
capture some of the special meanings and glosses that lay beneath
early American efforts to regulate -economy and society, and identify
the peculiar vision that sets those efforts apart from modern liberal
57

renderings.

The modem law of regulation revolves around a distinctly constitutional construction of the state police power. The police power is
envisioned as a judicially constructed balancing or "reasonableness"
test for determining when a regulatory statute passed by an otherwise

sovereign legislature conflicts with the specific requirements of the
Constitution. The exercise becomes a mixture of logomachy, logic,
statutory construction, comparative institutional choice, and modern
constitutional "science." The modern approach is positivist (regulation is viewed simply as the will of a sovereign state) and instrumental
56. The best representation of this historiographical problem is John Gough's discussion of how modem English historians, long-tutored in Parliamentary sovereignty, have
had considerable difficulty coming to terms with Sir Edward Coke and the idea that at
some point in history Parliament could be conceived of as limited. J.W. GoUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY'(1955).

57. The phrase "common regulation" itself was rarely used in the antebellum era. I
have found it only twice in the nineteenth-century federal courts. See Wight v. Curtis, 29 F.
Cas. 1170, 1172 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1845) (No. 17,628); Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 143
(1895). Indeed, the word "regulation" was rarely qualified in this period. A Westlaw
search of federal cases between the years 1813-1845 reveals that "regulation" was used by
itself nearly 80% of the time. When qualified, "regulation" was usually combined with a
relatively innocuous adjective like "municipal," "internal," or "general." Usages of "police
regulation" and "public regulation" were also extremely rare, appearing in only 60 of 2027
federal cases using the term "regulation" before 1870. Thus, in naming antebellum regulation, I am forced to rely on a designation not really natural to the period. "Police regulation" or "republican regulation" would have been useful tags if "police" and "republican"
were not mired in such deep historiographical and definitional quagmires. Even with long
clarifications as to what I would mean by "police" and "republican" these words would
drag along more baggage and confusion than enlightenment.
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(the police power is viewed as a tool for promoting and reconciling
the external goals of politics, power, and policy).5 8 The modem state
police power is not seen as containing in and of itself any compelling
aspirational, cultural, historical, or moral imperatives.
Common regulation is the product of a much different view of
law and society. Traces of this larger perspective are evident in the
very word "common." "Common" was a constant ingredient in nineteenth-century political and legal discourse. Though still a rich word
today, it was especially layered with meanings then. It was a synonym
for "public," used to identify objects, goals, and traits of a general
nature, belonging to the whole. It stressed those things shared rather
than individually possessed, binding society and mankind together
rather than pulling it apart. "Common" rippled with larger notions of
"community," "ordinariness" (as in the Third Estate), "intercourse"
(as in "communication" or "communion"), and "public goods" (as in
"the commons"). Even alone it resonated with hints of the ideas associated with some of its more famous couplings: "common good,"
"common rights," "common people," and "common weal." It was the
central component of the English translation ("commonwealth") of
the Latin res publica-the source of our own "republic. '59 By "common regulation" I hope not only to draw upon those potent sentiments swirling about the word "common," but to call particular
attention to two distinct features of early American regulatory policy:
its roots in the common-law and its vision of a commonwealth.
Common regulation was a product of the common-law vision of a
well-regulated society.60 The regulations listed above were not simply
58. Though there are many modem formulations of the police power, the rendition in
the first edition of the ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES best captures the
"empty," ex post facto quality of contemporary constitutional discourse:
Police power is an idiom of apologetics which belongs to the vocabulary of constitutional law. In American government the validity of any regulatory statute may,
in "a genuine case in controversy," be tested by judicial review. If the act is sustained, the police power is usually invoked as the sanction; if it is declared null
and void, some such phrase as "lack of jurisdiction" or "want of due process" lies
at the base of rationalization.
Walton H. Hamilton & Carlton C. Rodee, Police Power, in 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 190 (1933) (emphasis added).
59. An excellent source for the many uses and versions of "common" available in the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries is 3 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 564-65
(2d ed. 1989). See also ARTHUR F. McEvoY, THE FISHERMAN'S PROBLEM: ECOLOGY
AND LAW IN THE CALIFORNIA FISHERIES, 1850-1980, at 10-15 (1986); Carol Rose, The

Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property,53 U. CHI.
L. REV. 711 (1986).
60. NOVAK, supra note 26.
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expressions of a plenary state power limited by and played off against
written constitutional provisions. They were part and parcel of an
older social vision that took seriously the historical sensibility of the
common law and the aspirations of an ordered commonwealth. Regulation, like law, in the early republic was more than a reflection or
instrument of power and interests (economic, political, social, or technological). A crucial element of common regulation was an intellectual persuasion that envisioned regulation (like law) as a moral
exercise for the promotion of public happiness in the good society.
Central to this perspective were (1) an adherence to the common law
as an experiential yet flexible source of value and guidance; (2) an
overriding concern with common, rather than private goods and interests; and (3) a commitment to the commonwealth as the guarantor of
public happiness and the general welfare. Unlike the modern police
power, the essence of common regulation lay in common-law obligations rather than constitutional limitations.
But common regulation is distinguished from modern regulation
as much by its physical as its metaphysical characteristics. Whereas
modern regulation can more or less succinctly point to the constitutional definition of the state police power as a source of legitimacy and
authority, the roots of common regulation were more diverse. Far
from flowing from one doctrine or some primitive equivalent of the
police power, common regulation was really an amalgam of several
different and sometimes competing traditions, doctrines, and
practices.
A. Colonial Experience

One of the more important of these traditions was perhaps tradition itself. Though this Article concerns itself with public policy after
the Constitution was adopted, one of its goals is to dilute the customary historian's watershed marked by the years 1776-1787. Without
question, early modern habits, customs, and rules influenced public
policy well into the nineteenth century. And by all accounts, colonial
American society was a well-regulated one.61 Market regulations
61.
(1960);

GEORGE L. HASKINS, LAW ANDAUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS 66-84
WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACr OF
LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830 chs. 3 & 4 (1975). For a quick

gauge of continuity, compare Nelson's and Haskins's lists of regulated activities with the
statutes excerpted in Part II above. For excellent, concise treatments, see FORREST MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION
14-21 (1985); MILTON SYDNEY HEATH, CONSTRUCTIVE LIBERALISM: THE ROLE OF THE
STATE IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN GEORGIA TO 1860, at 55-57 (1954); CLARENCE L.
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against forestalling, engrossing, and regrating passed undisturbed by
Adam Smith, the Constitution, the Federalist Papers, and John Marshall from colonial statute books to the commentaries of Nathan Dane
to the incorporation of Albany in the early nineteenth century. 62
Other patterns and practices of colonial regulation from sumptuary
laws to mercantilist restrictions on commerce continued to find a
place in nineteenth-century policymaking. One need only reflect on
the long and varied history of "Sabbath," "Sunday," or "blue" laws to
63
make the case for the influence of tradition on regulatory policy.
B. Police
Other influences are less obvious and more specific. Not to be
underestimated was the broad European conception of "police" that
began to emerge in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Marc
Raeff has recently probed the links between this notion and the rise of
absolutism and the interventionist and regulatory Polizeistaatin Western and Central Europe. 64 "Police" in this sense stood for something
much grander than a municipal security force. It referred to the growing sense that the state had an obligation not merely to maintain order
and administer justice, but to aggressively foster "the productive energies of society and provid[e] the appropriate institutional framework
for it. '' 65 Other historians have found this strong notion of police ani66
mating public regulatory policy in Scotland and France.
VER STEEG, THE FORMATIVE YEARS, 1607-1763, at 195 (1964). The continuity of regula-

tion problemitizes but does not undermine the issues at stake in that staple (or red herring)
of colonial historiography-the "community-society" debate. David Konig and Bruce
Mann are the best representatives of this perspective in colonial legal history. DAVID
THOMAS KONIG, LAW AND SOCIETY IN PURITAN MASSACHUSETTS: EssEx COUNTY, 16291692 (1979); BRUCE H. MANN, NEIGHBORS AND STRANGERS: LAW AND COMMUNITY IN
EARLY CONNECTICUT (1987).
62. See MICHAEL G. KAMMEN, COLONIAL NEW YORK: A HISTORY 56-57 (1975);
SYDNEY V. JAMES, COLONIAL RHODE ISLAND: A HISTORY 157 (Milton M. Klein & Jacob

E. Cooke eds., 1975); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *158; 7 NATHAN DANE, A
GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW, WITH OCCASIONAL NOTES AND
COMMENTS 33-40 (1824); LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK chs. 185 & 191 (1826).
63. See WILLIAM ADDISON BLAKELY, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS BEARING ON SUNDAY LEGISLATION (1911).
64. See MARC RAEFF, THE WELL-ORDERED POLICE STATE: SOCIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE THROUGH LAW IN THE GERMANIES AND RUSSIA, 1600-1800 (1983); Marc

Raeff, The Well-Ordered Police State and the Development of Modernity in Seventeenthand Eighteenth-Century Europe: An Attempt at a Comparative Approach, 80 AM. HIST.
REV. 1221 (1975) [hereinafter Raeff, Well-Ordered Police State].
65. Raeff, Well-Ordered Police State, supra note 64, at 1226.
66. See W.G. Carson, Policing the Periphery: The Development of Scottish Policing
1795-1900, Part I, 17 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 207 (1984); 1 STEVEN L. KAPLAN,
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In America, "police" stood for new efforts on behalf of a dynamic
state to marshal resources and promote a well-ordered community devoted to the public happiness and public good. As Christopher Tomlins has definitively demonstrated, American lawyers and theorists
were well-acquainted with Continental developments in the science of
government. When Thomas Jefferson established the first law chair in

North America at William and Mary, he dubbed it a chair of "Law
and Police."'67 The whole concept of a well-regulated society articulated by a host of early American legal scholars meshed wonderfully
with the larger goals and objectives underlying Continental understandings of "police." The "police power" itself owes its etymology, if
not its substantive applications, to notions of Polizei. But regulation
in America also had more direct sources and vital traditions to draw
on, not least of these the peculiar practices associated with regulatory

law in England.
C. Sovereign Prerogative
Closely linked to "police" on the continent was the notion of the
sovereign prerogative in England. The "lex prerogativa" stood for
that complex and varied set of rights, powers, and privileges belonging
to the Crown as sovereign. Included in this bundle of prerogatives
were powers (and obligations) to regulate and promote the domestic
life of the kingdom. 68 Ernst Freund characterized this plenary sovereign power as the "royal police power"-the power lodged in the
King (with council in Star Chamber) to control the internal police of
Louis XV (1976); Thomas
Brennan, Police and Public Power in Ancient Regime France (paper delivered at American
Society for Legal History Conference, Atlanta, Feb. 1990) (on file with author). The most
representative contemporary "police" treatise is NICoLAs DELAMARE, TRArE DE POLICE
(1722).
67. I am indebted to Christopher Tomlins both for pointing me to these sources and
for generally educating me on the evolution of a European conception of "police." Those
seeking a more extensive genealogy, as well as an intriguing interpretation contrasting "police" with the American "rule of law," should go first to TOMLINS, supranote 23 (especially
ch. 2). Tomlins and I disagree, however, over the common law's ingrained hostility to the
broader notions of public responsibility contained in the Continental versions of "police."
68. Matthew Hale describes the prerogative as
that which asserts, maintains, and with all imaginable Care provides for the Safety
of the King's Royal Person, his Crown and Dignity, and all his just Rights, Revenues, Powers, Prerogatives, and Government, as the great Foundation (under
God) of the Peace, Happiness, Honour and Justice, of this Kingdom; and this Law
is also, that which declares and asserts the Rights and Liberties, and the Properties of the Subject; and is the just, known, and common Rule of Justice and Right
between Man and Man, within this Kingdom.
KING XXXViii (D.E.C. Yale ed., 1976).
MATrimw HALE, THE PREROGATIVES OF T
BREAD, PoLrrIcs AND POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE REIGN OF
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the realm. 69 Even after 1688 and the rise of Parliamentary sovereignty, Blackstone could still envision a royal prerogative whereby the
King was charged with an overarching, flexible responsibility for administering justice, conserving the peace, erecting corporations, and
"arbitrating" commerce. 70 Behind this prerogative lurked not only
specific powers to regulate public markets or set up courts, but a
residual sovereign power to do what was necessary to ensure the advantage of the public. Part of this is captured in Blackstone's conception of the kingdom as a "well-governed family" with the King as
master. 7 1 But as Joseph Chitty stressed in his 1820 treatise on the subject, "The splendour, rights, and powers of the Crown were attached
to it for the benefit of the people and not for the private gratification
of the sovereign." 72 In theory at least, the royal prerogative stemmed
from a public philosophy in which the object of government and law
was the welfare of the people. 73 In Chitty's words, "The prerogative is
not the iron tie of unbridled power: it holds the subject in the silken
chain of mild subjection, for the general and permanent welfare of
74
society."
The sovereign prerogative in England has a long, complicated career that is essentially the story of English constitutional and parliamentary history. I can only suggest here the degree to which the
notion of the sovereign as the locus of inherent and open-ended "police powers" guaranteeing the common welfare remained a theme of
American regulatory law well into the nineteenth century. On the
constitutional level especially, conceptions of state sovereignty and
state regulatory power moved hand-in-hand. In The License Cases,75
Chief Justice Roger Taney defined the states' police power as "nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty to the extent of its dominions. '76 New York Justice Andrews
69.
70.

FREUND, STANDARDS, supra note 35, at 38-39.
See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 62, at ch. VII (commentary entitled Of the King's
Prerogative); DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAW 101 (1941).
71. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 62, at *274; 4 id. at *162.

72. JOSEPH CHITrY, A
CROWN 4 (1820).

TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE PREROGATIVES OF THE

73. W.P. PRENTICE, POLICE POWERS ARISING UNDER THE LAW OF OVERRULING NECESSITY 7 (1894).

74. CHrrrY, supra note 72, at iii.
75. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 540 (1847).
76. Id. at 583 (opinion of Taney, C.J.). The best discussion of the police power's relationship to conceptions of state sovereignty is W.G. Hastings, The Development of Law as
Illustrated by the Decisions Relating to the Police Power of the State, 39 PROC. AM. PHIL.
Soc'Y 359 (1900). See also PRENTICE, supra note 73, at 4-10.
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echoed in 1889 that the police power "is but another name for that
authority which resides in every sovereignty to pass all laws, for the
internal regulation and government of the state, necessary for the
public welfare.

'77

But the English tradition of royal prerogative had a much greater
effect than merely influencing American discussions of "sovereignty."
Over and over again, the very entities controlled by royal prerogative
became the focus of early American regulation. Matthew Hale's and
Joseph Chitty's digests of seventeenth-century kingly powers look like
compendiums of the major public policies of the early nineteenth century. These included public lands, franchises (corporations, game and
forests, parks, fisheries, mines, fairs and markets), ports, monopolies,
patents, marts and fairs, weights and measures, money, parens patriae,
taxation, staples, prices, and highways. 78 Well into the late nineteenth
century, American regulation in these areas continued to be directly
influenced by the rationales and explanations supporting the notion of
prerogative.

79

D. Legislative Authority
Just as crucial, yet ultimately as obscure as the relationship between sovereignty and regulation in the nineteenth century, is the
complex link between regulation and changing conceptions of legislation. Sovereignty and legislation, of course, are closely related in
American law. As Justice Andrews pointed out, the "governmental
powers vested in the sovereign in England have since our Revolution
77. People v. Budd, 22 N.E. 670, 674 (N.Y. 1889). The continued hold of notions of
sovereignty over the definition of the state police power is indicated by Thomas J. Pitts's
definition in 1937:
It is not a power reserved but a right inherent in the State as sovereign and while
the power may be regulated and limited by the Constitution, it exists independently of it, as a necessary attribute of sovereignty .... The sovereign State has no
existence apart from and independent of the police power.
Thomas J. Pitts, The Nature and Implicationsof the Police Power,6 KAN. Crry L. RFv. 128,
128 (1937).
78. See Cmrry, supra note 72, at 107-242; HALE, supra note 68, at 201-321. Especially intriguing is the extensive attention each give to prerogatives regarding trade and
commerce.
79. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876); Budd, 22 N.E. at 670; O'Connor v. Pittsburgh, 18 Pa. 187 (1851). Julius Goebel suggested that judicial doctrines surrounding the
king's prerogative are almost the exclusive source of public law and political theory in
medieval England. Thus, its continued hold over early American public law should not be
surprising. See Julius Goebel, Jr., Constitutional History and Constitutional Law, 38
COLUM. L. Rlv. 555, 561 (1938).
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devolved on the legislatures of the states." 80 Roger Taney's discussion

of sovereignty and police in The License Cases revolved exclusively
around his conception of legislative authority. 81 But though the "police power" refers to a distinctly legislative power, the cross-fertiliza-

tion

between

legislation

and

regulation

is

anything

but

straightforward. "What is legislation?" remains the great underlying,

unresolved problem of nineteenth-century jurisprudence. Though
some historians have argued that post-Revolutionary state legislatures
simply operated as modern, positivist and plenary law-making author-

ities (limited only by express constitutional limitations), I would like
to make the case for a more problematic, ambiguous approach to legislation in early America. 82 In particular, I would contend that the

years before the Civil War marked a pre-positivist legislative moment
where most jurists and political thinkers continued to resist a notion of
law as simply the command or will of a sovereign legislature. Instead,
they remained wedded to a more organic, fundamental legal tradition
wherein even legislative power was conceived of and interpreted

within a common-law framework.
Like its more famous anti-positivist neighbors constitutionalism
and natural law, the common-law approach to legislation is to some

extent rooted in the ancient English notion of "fundamental law."'83
80. Budd, 22 N.E. at 678.
81. The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 573-86 (1847) (opinion of Taney, C.J.).
82. For the most famous proponents of this widely shared perspective, see HORwrrz,
TRANSFORMATION, supra note 23 (especially ch. 1);

HURST,

CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM,

supra note 22, at 10; JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE
LAW MAKERS 30-33 (1950); NELSON, supra note 61, at 90-92. Nelson takes the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 at face value in asserting that the legislature possessed "full
power and authority.., to make, ordain, and establish, all manner of... laws, statutes, and
ordinances... as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of this Commonwealth."
Id. at 90 (quoting MAss. CONST. pt. II, ch. 1, § 1, art. 4 (1780)). Though the "positivism" of
this proclamation may seem transparent to twentieth-century observers, nineteenth-century commentators were not so sure of themselves. They usually followed up constitutional assertions of legislative "law-making" power with provocative questions like "But,
what is a law?" or "What is a statute?" Such questions opened up whole new levels of
jurisprudential commentary as to what the exact nature and extent of legislative authority
was and should be. For examples of this argument, see E. FITCH SMITH, COMMENTARIES
ON STATUTE AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 290-91 (1848); G.A. ENDLICH, A COMMENTARY
ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 2 n.1 (1888).
83. The perspective that follows is put together from hints and suggestions in the following works (none of which really gets at the exact relationship between fundamental and
common law that I think is operating in the regulatory cases): 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., THE
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801 (1971) (especially ch. 1); GOUGH, supra
note 56; CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN
(1947); C.H. MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM & THE CHANGING WORLD (1939); CHARLES
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In the fundamental law tradition, Parliament (like the early Massa-

chusetts legislature) was viewed as a "high" or "general" court, not so
much enacting its will as pronouncing judgments "declaratory of the
moral principles of the law." 4 Law and politics were suffused with
ethics and religion. Public authority was not legitimate unless it conformed to principles of right and justice removed from simple questions of utility, power, or expediency. As Saint Augustine suggested,
"Without justice, what were kingdoms but great robberies." 's5
Though this might sound like natural law (especially if one had to
decipher divine rules or reify a Lockean social contract), the nineteenth-century American version was more historical and naturalistic.
It fit roughly with the "third way" charted between the extremes of

positivism and natural law by theorists of a dynamic ancient constitutionalism in seventeenth-century England and the historical jurisprudence of nineteenth-century Germany.8 6 American commentators

perceived legislation as derivative of, and secondary to, the higher objects of society; it had no meaning or authority outside of the "plan by
which the nation resolved to endeavor to obtain happiness."S7 That
plan and object could not be captured once and for all in a written
HOWARD McILwAIN, THE HIGH COURT OF PARLIAMENT AND ITS SUPREMACY (1910);
J.G.A. PoCOCK,THE ANCImNT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW (1957); JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY
OF RIGHTS (1986); JOSEPH H. SMITH, APPEALS TO THE PRIVY COUNCIL FROM THE AMERICAN PLANTATIONS (1950) (especially pp. 523-53); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 259-305 (1969); Goebel, ConstitutionalHistory,

supra note 79; Thomas C. Grey, Originsof the Unwritten Constitution: FundamentalLaw
in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978); Samuel P. Huntington,
PoliticalModernization: America vs. Europe, in POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIS 93-139 (Samuel P. Huntington ed., 1968); Stanley N. Katz, The American Constitution:
A Revolutionary Interpretation,in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF CONSTITUTION
Am AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 23 (Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987). The standard
source on fundamental law and constitutionalism is Edward S. Corwin, The "HigherLaw"
Backgroundof American ConstitutionalLaw, 42 HARV. L. REV. 149 & 365 (1928-29). On
natural law, see CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS

(1930);

BENJAMIN FLETCHER WRIGHT, JR., AMERICAN INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL
LAW: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT (1931).

84. WOOD, supra note 83, at 263.
85. As quoted in GOUGH, supra note 56, at 22.
86. See POCOCK, supra note 83; PETER STEIN, LEGAL EVOLUTION: THE STORY OF AN
IDEA (1980); JAMES Q. WHITMAN, THE LEGACY OF ROMAN LAW IN THE GERMAN RoMANTC ERA: HISTORICAL VISION AND LEGAL CHANGE (1990); Steve Pincus, Shadwell's

Dramatic Trimming (forthcoming 1995).
87. SMITH, supra note 82, at 246. Indeed, if read closely, the "natural-law" theorists
most cited by early Americans (Grotius, Vattel, and Rutherford) are far more historicist,
realistic, and public-minded in their thinking than the caricature of "natural law" bequeathed to us by Corwin, Haines, and Wright.
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constitution, or a hypothesized state of nature, or an absolute entity
like private property. Guidance on the many dimensions of this fundamental law was available only in the open-ended, living, experiential lessons of the common law. Though constitutions provided
concrete limitations and express grants of authority, the common law
remained the overarching interpretive schema through which jurists
and legislators decided what, how, and why things could be done via
statute.
Though this relationship between statute and common law may
seem rather fuzzy, two things suggest that a common-law conception
of legislation continued to predominate in the nineteenth century.
First, a host of non-constitutional theoretical equivocations about legislative power suffused discussions of regulation, codification, judicial
review, and statutory interpretation. Well into the late nineteenth
century, commentators and theorists refused to accept a simple and
closed definition of "statutory law" as the command of the supreme
power of the state. They continuously cited "the will of the people,"
"constitutional conformity," and subsequent interpretations by
"courts of justice" as definitional attributes of "statute law." Rather
than seeing legislation as positivist, presentist "will," Joel Bishop argued in 1873, "Every statute operates to modify something in the law
which existed before. No statute is written, so to speak, upon a blank
in the institutions of society. No such blank exists or can exist." Consequently, "no statute can be understood except by him who understands the prior law."88 In other words, legislating was not unlike the
traditional job of common-law courts-adjusting, changing, and interpreting older law to meet changing conditions.
Secondly, the whole story of legislative regulation well into the
late nineteenth century is replete with common-law methods, forms,
strategies, and traditions. Had legislation simply been a matter of legislative will and constitutional limitations, there would have been no
88. JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE WRITTEN LAWS AND THEIR INTERPRETATION 4 (1882); see also ENDLICH, supra note 82, at 2. Such themes are the basis

for almost every treatise on statutory construction in the nineteenth century. See JOHN
NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO MUNICIPAL LAW 28-56 (1883); SMITH, supra
note 82 (especially ch. 7). Perhaps the most famous nineteenth-century text on statutory
construction is THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GovERN THE
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

(1857).

The entire treatise is devoted not to arguing in a plenary, positivist mode that legislatures
can do anything not explicitly constitutional, but that legislatures "can do no act which is
not law." Id. at 676. The notion reverberates with John Adams's "a government of laws,
and not of men," as well as Bishop's conception of legislation as part of a continuous
process of applying law. MASS. CONST. art. 30 (1780); see BISHOP, supra.
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need for all this talk about sovereign prerogative, overruling necessity,
saluspopuli,sic utere tuo, and the common law of nuisance. But legislation and regulation were not simply matters of will in the nineteenth
century. They were pieces of a lingering common-law mind-set that
pursued the public good and happiness not as a function of utility,
expedience, gain, interest, or power, but in accordance with an organic
fundamental law and morality embedded in common experience, reflected however imperfectly in the maxims, principles, and practices of
the common law.
E. Salus Populi, Overruling Necessity, ParensPatriae,and Sic Utere Tuo

Besides being the general source for early American notions of
police, sovereignty, legislation, and law, the common law contained
specific doctrines that greatly influenced judicial constructions of common regulation. The most important of these was the maxim salus
populi suprema lex est (the welfare of the people is the supreme
law).89 If one were forced to reduce the idea of a fundamental common law to a single doctrine, most likely it would be salus populi.90
Whereas the Lockean social contract yielded fundamental natural private rights, the common-law notion of salus populi held that those
rights were "conventional," subject to the "higher law" of the common welfare.
Salus populi had many sources and expressions. The most abstract forms emanated from civil-law writers like Emmerich de Vattel,
who based the legitimacy of all society and government on its ability
to promote the general happiness of mankind.91 American versions
most often took the shape of Chancellor Kent's declaration that "private interest must be made subservient to the general interest of the
community." Kent used this rationale to uphold governmental regulations of unwholesome trades, slaughter houses, gunpowder, cemeteries, and the like. As Justice Holmes accurately noted later, this
89. Saluspopuli(translated as "regard for the public welfare is the highest law") is the
first maxim discussed in HERBERT BROOM, A SELECTION OF LEGAL MAXIMS 1 (9th ed.
1924). For a more instrumentalist interpretation of saluspopuli role in seventeenth-century English political debate, see J.A.W. GUNN, POLrrTCs AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN
THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

(1969).

90. Indeed, in some ways the common-law renditions of police, sovereignty, legislation, and law discussed above flow directly out of the general notion that common law
must conform to the common welfare. Salus populi is the "natural law" of the common
law. For a suggestive discussion, see GouoH, supra note 56, at 99-102.
91. EMMERICH DE VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS lix-lx (Joseph Chitty ed., 1849)
(1797)); 2 Huo GROTrUs, DE JuRE BELLI Ac PACIS LIBRI TRES bk. I, at 9-45 (Francis W.
Kelsey trans., 1964) (1624).
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doctrine was the foundation for the state police power.92 Indeed, the
salus populi maxim is most often encountered in appellate cases justifying state regulations that restrict private rights in the common
interest.
The doctrine of overruling necessity flowed directly from the assumptions of salus populi and sovereign prerogative. If the common
welfare and safety of society were the highest law, it followed that
when the preservation of that society was at stake lesser rules and
conventions gave way. In its most basic form, the law of overruling
necessity was a social version of the law of self-defense. 93 American
courts and commentators consistently referred to a line of English
cases making it "well settled at common law" that in cases of calamity
(e.g., fire, pestilence, or war) individual interests, rights, or injuries
would not inhibit the preservation of the common weal. 94 Thus, private houses could be pulled down or bulwarks raised on private property without compensation when the safety and security of the many
depended upon it.95 As Thomas Cooley later reasoned, "Here the in92. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 340 (O.W. Holmes, Jr. ed.,
12th ed. 1873). Holmes's comments appear in id. at 441 n.2.
93. PRENTICE, supra note 73, at 4; see also THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 594-95 (1868); 2 KENT, supra note 92, at 338-40; PLAT
POTrER, DWARRIS ON STATUTES 444-45 (1871); Harrison H. Brace, To What Extent May
Government in the Exercise of its Police Power, Take, Destroy or Damage Private Property
Without Giving Compensation Therefor?, CHI. L. NEWS, June 19, 1886, at 340; Pitts, supra
note 77, at 132; Scott M. Reznick, Empiricism and the Principleof Conditions in the Evolution of the Police Power: A Model for DefinitionalScrutiny, 1978 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 19-20
(1978).
94. See, e.g., Maleverer v. Spinke, 73 Eng. Rep. 79, 81 (K.B. 1538); Case of the King's
Prerogative in Saltpetre, 77 Eng. Rep. 1294, 1294 (K.B. 1607); Mouse's Case, 77 Eng. Rep.
1341, 1342 (K.B. 1609); British Cast Plate Mfrs. v. Meredith, 100 Eng. Rep. 1306, 1307
(K.B. 1792). In Saltpetre, Coke argues that
for the commonwealth, a man shall suffer damage; as, for saving of a city or town,
a house shall be plucked down if the next be on fire: and the suburbs of a city in
time of war for the common safety shall be plucked down; and a thing for the
commonwealth every man may do without being liable to an action.
Saltpetre, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1295. Justice Buller in Meredith echoes,
There are many cases in which individuals sustain an injury, for which the law
gives no action; for instance, pulling down houses, or raising bulwarks, for the
preservation and defence of the Kingdom against the King's enemies.... This is
one of those cases to which the maxim applies, "Salus populi suprema est lex."
100 Eng. Rep. at 1307-08 (emphasis added).
95. The doctrine first appears in American case law in 1788 in Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 U.S. (1 DalI.) 357 (1788). For examples of the continued use of the concept of
necessity in American law, see Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135 (1921) (discussing rent controls to abate emergency housing conditions); American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47
(1911) (discussing the San Francisco earthquake); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11
(1905) (discussing compulsory smallpox vaccines); Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16 (1879)
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dividual is in no degree in fault, but his interest must yield to that
'necessity' which 'knows no law."' The injury to the individual was
damnum absque injuria (an injury without a remedy) under the reasoning that "a private mischief shall be endured, rather than a public
inconvenience.

'96

But overruling necessity was more than a social self-defense
mechanism. Early on, natural-law writers suggested the wider potential of the law of necessity. Thomas Rutherford argued that "necessity
sets property aside"-things necessary "continue in common. ' 97 Like
Grotius and Pufendorf, Rutherford contended that an extreme want
of food or clothing justified theft. Property was relational, dependent
on the common consent of all. No one could be assumed to have consented away the right to use another's property when self-preservation
or social preservation were in jeopardy. Necessity revived a "community of goods," where all things were available to common use for
common benefit. Though, as Blackstone made clear, civil-law ideas
on theft never made their way into English common law, the broader
conceptions of consent, conventional and relational property rights,
the community of goods, and public necessity trumping private interest did.98 These notions provided a more open-ended backdrop for
defending legislative and sovereign prerogatives in cases of public
need, beyond extreme cases of calamity. At least two commentators
rooted the entire police power in "the law of overruling necessity." 99
Though perhaps best known for its role in state regulation of the
family and child custody, the parens patriae doctrine also affected
American regulatory law across the spectrum. 10 Parenspatriae was
rooted in the sovereign prerogative. As Chitty put it:
(discussing fire). For more on these later necessity cases, see generally RODNEY L. MOTr,
DuE PROCESS OF LAW 344-60 (1926); Reznick, supra note 93, at 51-54.
96. COOLEY, supra note 93, at 594-95; see also 2 KENT, supra note 92, at 338.
Damnum absque injuria is itself a key common-law maxim in nineteenth-century regulatory law. The common law was not presumed to provide a remedy for every actual injury.
The higher prerogatives of the common law often made it necessary for individual injuries
to go unredressed in the common interest. See Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights
Debate in Analytical Jurisprudencefrom Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 975.
97. 1 THOMAS RuTHERFORD, INSTrrUTaS OF NATURAL LAW 93-96 (1799).
98. 4 BL.cKsToNE, supra note 62, at *31-32.
99. PRENTIcE, supra note 73; POTTER, supra note 93, at 444-67.
100. See GROSSBERG, supra note 27, at 236-37; George B. Curtis, The Checkered Career of Parens Patriae: The State as Parent or Tyrant?, 25 DEPAUL L. REv. 895 (1976)
(discussing the development and use of the parens patriae doctrine from its early English
origins to its modem American employment in cases involving juveniles, mental incompetents, and the protection of interests held by the general populace); Douglas R. Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C. L. REv. 205 (1971)
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The king is in legal contemplation the guardian of his people, and in
that amiable capacity is entitled... to take care of his subjects as
are legally unable, on account of mental incapacity, whether it proceed from first nonage: second, idiocy: or third, lunacy: to take
proper care of themselves and their property. 101
Essentially, parens patriae conceived of the king or sovereign as parent. 02 But in addition to equipping the sovereign with specific powers
to regulate and protect special classes of persons and institutions (e.g.,
children, incompetents, charities), parens patriae operated metaphorically on common regulation in general.
The classic statement on the links between state and family is, of
course, Robert Filmer's Patriarcha.0 3 Despite John Locke's famous
critique," 4 paternalism remained a compelling framework for jurists
to elaborate theories of kingly or state power. Matthew Hale recognized only two types of government: natural and civil. Natural government entailed the relationship between parent and child from
which civil (political and economic) government drew its model. 10 5
Blackstone was just as fond of the analogy. He defined "public police
and economy" as "the due regulation and domestic order of the kingdom: whereby the individuals of the state, like members of a wellgoverned family, are bound in their general behaviour to conform to
the rules of propriety, good neighbourhood, and good manners." The
king or sovereign was the head of this political family, with discretionary power to "dispose," "order," and regulate it.106 This metaphorical
equation of sovereignty and parenthood (or fatherhood, in this distinctly patriarchal society), rooted in the common law, was a pervasive
factor in early nineteenth-century attempts to assess the boundaries of
public power.
Finally, one of the most powerful doctrines shaping early American conceptions of public authority was the maxim sic utere tuo ut
(tracing the evolution of parenspatriae and the juvenile court through the nineteenth century). For a discussion of parens patriae's role in the regulation of public nuisances, see
John C. Bagwell, The CriminalJurisdictionof Equity-Purpresturesand Other PublicNuisances Affecting Health and Safety, 20 Ky. L.J. 163 (1932).
101. CHITTY, supra note 72, at 155 (footnote omitted).
102. For the implications of such a conception well into the twentieth century, see
David J. Rothman, The State as Parent. Social Policy in the Progressive Era, in WILLARD
GAYLIN ET AL., DOING GOOD: THE LIMITS OF BENEVOLENCE (1978).
103. SIR ROBERT FILMER, PATRIARCHA AND OTHER WRITINGS (Johann P. Somerville

ed., 1991) (1679).
104.

JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed.,

1764).
105.

HALE, supra note 68, at 1.

106.

4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 62, at *161-62; 1 id. at *264.

1960) (6th ed.
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alienum non laedas (use your own so as not to injure another) of the
common-law of nuisance. Ernst Freund captured the strong public
potential of nuisance law when he dubbed it "the common law of the
police power, striking at all gross violations of health, safety, order,
and morals."' 107 Public nuisance law provided the common-law foundation for common regulation. And "nuisance" was hardly the timid
regulatory instrument implied by some legal historians. 08 Declaring
an activity or establishment a nuisance in the early nineteenth century
unleashed the full power and authority of the early American state.
Perhaps under no other circumstances could private property and liberty be as quickly and completely restrained or destroyed without a
hint of compensation.
More importantly, by nineteenth-century standards, nuisance was
not primarily a matter of technical, private law at all. Rather, the underlying sic utere tuo rationale of nuisance was a fundamental, public
ordering principle of society. Horace Wood declared as late as 1875
that sic utere tuo was a "well-established, and exceedingly comprehensive rule of the common law.., which is the legal application of the
gospel rule of doing unto others as we would that they should do unto
us."' 09 Wood elaborated in terms echoing those of Chief Justice Shaw
in Commonwealth v. Alger:
No man is at liberty to use his own without any reference to the
health, comfort or reasonable enjoyment of like public or private
rights by others. Every man gives up something of this absolute
right of dominion and use of his own, to be regulated or restrained
by law, so that others may not be hurt or hindered in the use or
enjoyment of their property. This is the fundamental principle of all
regulated civil communities, and without it society could hardly exist, except by the law of the strongest.' 10
Clearly there is more to nineteenth-century conceptions of public
power than implied by liberal constitutionalism and its theorists and
historians.
107.
108.

FREUND, STANDARDS, supra note 35, at 66.
EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT. A HISTORY OF
OUR CONSTIrTUTONAL THEORY 68 (1934); FREUND, POLICE POWER, supra note 35, at 2526,425; HoRwrrz, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 23, at 74-78; LEvy, supra note 34, at 25254 (1957); MARTIN V. MELOSI, POLLUTION AND REFORM IN AMERICAN CITIES, 1870-1930,

at 18 (1980); Joel Franklin Brenner, Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution, 3 J.
LEGAL STrUD. 403 (1974); Paul M. Kurtz, Nineteenth Century Anti-EntrepreneurialNuisance
Injunctions-Avoiding the Chancellor, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 621 (1976).
109. 1 HORACE G. WOOD, A PRACCcAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NUISANCES 30 (3d
ed., Bancroft-Whitney 1893).
110. Id.
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Conclusion
These are just some of the traditions and doctrines that informed
nineteenth-century conceptions of state regulatory power. Many
more can be unearthed. But even this preliminary sketch suggests
how different nineteenth-century assumptions about state power, public values, and private rights were from the taken-for-granted definitions and sequences of twentieth-century constitutionalism.
On the simplest level, the presence of extensive regulatory statutes and rationales like salus populi call into question the received
historical wisdom bolstering liberal constitutionalism. In contrast to
the classical, Corwin thesis, American constitutionalism has not been
uniformly wedded to a single founding doctrine solicitous of private
rights over public goods. The early republic, far from being the formative era of an on-going tradition of vested rights, due process, and
judicial review, gave rise to potent constitutional renderings of the
public powers of the state. When public welfare, happiness, and values were threatened, nineteenth-century jurists could summon powerful public legal doctrines and technologies to their defense. The
nineteenth century was anything but the "golden age" of individual
right and laissez-faire celebrated by conservative jurists from the Progressive era to the present.
But the idea of common regulation implies more than the need to
merely adjust our constitutional timeline, "bringing the state back
into" nineteenth-century public law. For such a revision could be easily tamed and absorbed into the master narrative of American constitutionalism, the emergence of liberalism and capitalism. Indeed, such
a revision could be used to argue that full-blown judicial balancing of
plenary public powers and absolute individual rights was coincident
with the birth of the republic. Such a conclusion would be erroneous.
For common regulation was predicated precisely on an unwillingness
to separate out private from public interests, individual rights from
larger social obligations. The notion of common regulation was based
on a vision of a "well-regulated" society, overtly hostile to the nominalistic conceptions of self-interest, possessive individualism, and competition at the heart of the liberal-capitalist version of our
constitutional heritage. It represents a genuine historical alternative-"a world we have lost."
The retrieval and reconstruction of this other American constitutionalism provides a contextual and critical perspective from which to
assess contemporary constitutional doctrine. For one troubled by
modern jurists' musings on the irreconcilability of public values and
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private rights in American constitutional law, it is helpful to know that
theirs has not been the only way of breaking up, categorizing, and
understanding American law and society. The legal-intellectual constructs of modem liberal constitutionalism are neither timeless nor autonomous. They are contingent and historical creations.
Similarly, the attempt to historicize and situate (sequentially and
contextually) American constitutional law poses a sharp challenge to
the presentist and teleological enterprise of tracing (or assuming) the
roots of liberal jurisprudence through the deep recesses of the past to
the wellsprings of Western civilization. For what this quick survey of
nineteenth-century evidence suggests is that liberal legalism is primarily a twentieth-century convention not a pre-determined end of history. Consequently, it is perhaps time for constitutional scholars to
abandon the endless post-war quest for a trans-historical Archimedean point (economic law or original position) on which to build a
final, apolitical jurisprudentia liberalis and revive instead Justice
Holmes's often-quoted (and more often ignored) legal-historical insight, "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience." 1 1' In place of hubristic attempts to devise and implement a
more perfect, scientific jurisprudence, we should look anew at the potential for constitutional wisdom attending historical perspectives on
the relationship of American law, economy, and society. For despite
the intricate constitutional logic, science, and theory that overflows
this Symposium and other law reviews, we still have a remarkably
"thin" understanding of the basic social and political struggles that led
to the ascendancy of liberal constitutionalism and the decline of competitors like common regulation. Ideally, such understanding would
be the first step in any reasonable assessment of the significance and
persistence of the public-private distinction, the balancing test, and
"rights talk" in late twentieth-century American jurisprudence.
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